Combating Radicalisation and the Scourge of New Terrorism in the 21st Century: The Case of Africa

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Abstract: The spate of radicalisation and terrorism across the globe in the 21st-century has assumed an alarming proportion. Efforts aimed at combating the phenomenon have not yielded the desired results, thus, prompting world leaders to look for alternative measures. The volatile political situations in Syria, Libya and Iraq have further complicated the plight, providing safe havens for terrorist groups such as the Islamic State and al-Qaeda. Africa continues to witness a crescendo of terrorist related attacks and deaths. Boko Haram, al-Shabaab, Fulani Militant, al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups continue with their onslaughts on the continent. Dwelling on both empirical and theoretical debates, this study provides insight into the dynamics of terrorism on the continent, especially in the 21st-century; analyses existing literature and extend it by making further recommendations to the fight against world's 21st- century deadly common foe, terrorism. The study concludes with a call on political, religious and other opinion leaders to consciously and continuously embark on de-radicalisation processes and adopt a nationwide citizen/community vigilantism scheme.

Keywords: radicalisation, extremism, citizen/community vigilantism, new and old terrorism.

I. INTRODUCTION

Since September 11, 2001, the world has seen an enormous rise in the incidents of radicalisation and its bedfellow, terrorism. Preventive measures and policies adopted by many states, especially Western democracies to curtail these incidents of terrorism by violent extremist organizations and individuals have not yielded the desired impacts. Interestingly, despite the salience of terrorism today, scholars and policymakers are only beginning to appreciate its complexity and multi-layered nature; they do not understand how and why it works.

Writing on terrorism in 1994, Martha Crenshaw made clear how terrorism had become a feature within insurgence movements, political assassinations, military coups, as well as a range of intra- and interstate wars that adversely impact most African states especially during the continent's transition to independence and subsequent post-colonial period. Crenshaw (1994) further asserted that terrorism was not "an isolated phenomenon" for African states or the region more broadly.

Generally, many scholars specialising in terrorism concur that the literature on the radicalisation process is inadequate, thus, requiring further exploration (Wilner & Dubouloz 2010; Jenkins 2011; McCauley & Moskalenko 2011; Bartlett & Miller 2012; Barnes 2012; Bjelopera 2013; Michael 2012b; Ramakrishna 2008, 2009; Springer 2012; cited in Orlandrew & Lisandra 2015). In the case of Africa, very little has been done in this regard. Yet, Africa is not the least spared by the sting of the 21st century rise and spread of radicalisation and terrorism. Many young men and women have been lured into believing the so-called 'just-cause-fight' and its accompanying greener pitfalls. Even university graduates have fallen victims – following extremist ideologies and pressure from impoverished situations. Like it occurs in most countries in the Middle East, Asia and the West, radicalisation and terrorism in Africa are two social and political cankers that have

eaten deep into the very fabric of society and take multifaceted roots. While some terrorists claim popular sovereignty, others are hard-line religious fanatics; some even simply, political tools for unleashing mayhem and seeking a regime change or regime survival. What then is the nature of terrorism and radicalisation in today's global sphere? What is/are the process(es) of radicalisation in today's world? How deep is the linkage between radicalisation and terrorism in the world today? What new measures can be employed in tackling the situation and how? How does it operate in Africa?

With the rise of Boko Haram and resurfacing of al-Qaida and Al-Shabaab, al-Murabitoun (AMB), the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), the Macina Liberation Front (MLF), and Ansar al-Dine (AAD), the Lord's Resistance Army in Uganda coupled with ISIL/ISIS and its influence in Africa and the globe at large, the threat of terrorism in Africa is far from over. Terrorism– generally defined as a tactic that uses violence or the threat of violence as a coercive strategy to cause fear and political intimidation – is just one of several kinds of political/religious and social violence that many states and their citizens both in Africa and other parts of the globe, have had to grapple with. As argued by Forest and Giroux (2011):

In fact, from a macro perspective, terrorism may not be universally seen as the most important security challenge faced by African states and their citizens. Famine, drought, endemic poverty, diseases and other natural and man-made disasters that undermine human security have also been at the forefront of recent policy discussions on Africa among Western governments and international aid organizations.

However, placing terrorism within the broader terrain of Africa's security challenges vis-à-vis its historical trends and context presents an equal gloomy picturesque necessitating major regional and global concerns. The complexity and multi-directional approach to terrorism in Africa is a grave concern to not only African leadership bodies like the AU, ECOWAS, NEPAD, SADC, EAC but other supranational institutions like the UN, IMF, WB, ICC. Unlike what usually happens in the West, where terrorism is basically engaged in by jihadists in a gang or group form and lone wolves, terrorism in Africa especially, and some parts of Asia and the Middle East cuts across a continuum of politicians including even incumbent presidents and opposition leaders, jihadists, lone wolves, insurgents, just to mention a few. Thus, this presents a greater challenge to the fight against both the process of radicalisation and terrorism as it calls for the adoption of variant measures of alleviation.

Terrorism in Africa encapsulates both ideologically-inspired violent non-state groups that visit mayhem on innocent civilians and government apparatuses sporadically like the Lord's Resistance Army in Uganda, al-Shabaab in Somalia or al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb in North Africa, and irresponsible politicians and/or governments that have resorted to using terrorism as a tool for either quelling dissent groups or individuals or simply victimizing or weakening their opponents' fronts in order to hold on to power. Such tactics may include, for example, a brutal crackdown against opposition leaders or dissent groups as in the cases of Zimbabwe and Libya, respectively; or the support of a terrorist group by one regime or the other against another neighbouring country. These incidents are not however, peculiar to only Africa; there are replicas in Asia, central Europe and the Middle East. This study, however, focuses on terrorism perpetuated by globally acclaimed terror groups, especially in the 21st-century.

Given the above complexity of the phenomenon, it is imperative for African leaders and policy makers to appreciate the dynamics of terrorism in Africa; its contemporary issues and trends as well as the existing ways of panacea and the way forward. Dwelling on both empirical and theoretical debates, this study provides insight into the dynamics of terrorism on the continent, especially in the 21st century; analyses existing literature and extend it by making further recommendations to the fight against world's 21st century deadly common foe, terrorism.

II.   THE LINK BETWEEN RADICALISATION AND TERRORISM

The rampancy of terrorist acts and their accompanying radicalism and the failure of the world to effectively address the situation, coupled with the instability of the Arab region and some of the Islamic states beyond that region heralds a possible prolonged security derangement in the 21st-century (Cronin 2003: 30). Terrorism has become much diffused in the contemporary global society, employing complicated mechanisms and strategies geared toward not only unleashing venom on humanity, but also to radicalise people, especially the youth to ensure the perpetuation of its heinous acts (Cronin 2003: 30). Cronin, in other words, suggests that terrorism has become a complex global subject that can best be tackled if its nature and nexus of radicalisation are divulged and appreciated. He therefore retorts that:

Few members of the U.S. policymaking and academic communities… have the political capital, intellectual background, or inclination to work together to forge an effective, sustained response [to the terrorism and its antecedent, radicalisation]. Instead, the tendency has been to fall back on established bureaucratic mind-sets and prevailing theoretical paradigms that have little relevance for the changes in international security that became obvious after the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington on September 11, 2001. (Cronin 2003: 30).

Borum (2011 cited in Decker & Pyrooz 2011:153) defines radicalisation as 'the process of developing extremist ideologies and beliefs.' Borum, according to Deckor & Pyrooz (2011: 153) reinforces the role of "action pathways" or "action scripts" as been crucial 'to understanding how extremist ideologies and beliefs are translated into "terrorism or violent extremist actions.' Deckor & Pyrooz conclude that radicalisation procedures and extremist ideologies and actions are profound and they encompasses a number of vital issues ranging from 'public policy, social and economic factors, group processes, belief systems, and individual motivations and predispositions' (ibid.). Corroborating this assertion, Atran (2003: 1534) and Hofmann (2012:12) contend that the process of radicalisation is what 'suicide-bomber recruiting organizations' or terrorists usually capitalise upon.

Tracing radicalisation processes, Ashour (2010) identifies the internet as one of the major tools used for 'home-grown terrorist radicalisation.' He therefore outlines a three-pillared strategy for the implementation of online terrorist radicalisation counter-narratives: the message, the messenger and the media. Ashour's finding and suggestions corroborate the findings and recommendations of Cornish (2008) on the use of the internet as a major conduit for radicalisation and then terrorism. He and his panel members also agree that the effective way to deal with the situation is for both governments and industry to work in tandem to monitor the (internet) behaviour of people, especially the youth.

Kydd & Walter's (2006) study of the goals and strategies of terrorists suggests 'five principal strategic logics of costly signalling at work in terrorist campaigns: (1) attrition, (2) intimidation, (3) provocation, (4) spoiling, and (5) outbidding' and five basic goals: 'regime change, territorial change, policy change, social control, and status quo maintenance' (ibid. 51-52) respectively. Kydd & Walter also quote Alan Krueger & Jitka Maleckova (2003), Alan Krueger & David Laitin (2003), and Alberto Abadie (2004) (cited in Kydd & Walter 2006), as having traced the effects of poverty, education, and political freedom on terrorist recruitment and/or radicalisation (ibid., 50). They argue that a better appreciation of the five strategic logics is sine qua non to a better understanding of terrorism as well as designing effective counter-terrorist policies. Thus, as admitted by Ashour (2010), Cornish (2008), and Kydd and Walter (2006), today's terrorism has taken a major encompassing trend using several tactical means to radicalise people and usher them into extremism.

Terrorist groups such as ISIL and Boko Haram capitalise on people's vulnerable situations to radicalise them. Jessica Stern's examination of the grievances that often culminate in terrorism and the networks, money, and operations that give impetus to jihadist and other extremist organizations explains how such organizations are formed by self-seeking leaders (Stern, 2003). These leaders usually under the guise of religion inspire and recruit the disgruntled or 'disenfranchised' (Ibid).

Robin Thompson's article, 'Radicalisation and the use of social media' explains how and why social media sites (Whatsapp, Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, etc.) have become effective radicalisation tools. Like Cornish (2008) and Ashour (2010), Thompson raises the issue of the role of technology, especially the internet. She further laments its potential "threat to national security by encouraging home-grown terrorism' (cited in Hofmann: 2012). Her work presents as Hofmann articulates:

its case with three observations: (1) the ubiquity and reach of social media, (2) arguing that social media is the "perfect voice" for radicals trying to rally supporters to a cause, and (3) an analysis of how social media played a role in the 2011 Arab Spring uprisings. (Hofmann, 2012)

However, Danzell & Montanez (2015) give a twist to what most scholars in radicalisation and terrorism conceive as the nature and processes of radicalisation and extremism. Danzell & Montanez's study of 'lone wolf terrorists' reveals that some jihadists/terrorists do not commit atrocities because they are influenced by the ideologies or motivations of a terror group or organization. They maintain that individuals are equally likely to be radicalised by their own experiences and perception of society. Citing McCauley and Moskalenko (2011), they illustrate their claim by referring to the cases of Andrdei Zhelyabov (a Russian student who became radicalised) and Vera Zazulichi (a Russian Marxist who attempted to assassinate Russian official Fedor Trepov) as evidence of what McCauley and Moskalenko (2011: 14) call "the path

between personal grievances and political violence." Danzell & Montanez (2015:8), therefore, conclude that the 'combination of ideology and personal vengeance is pivotal in escalating the dangers and threats executed by lone wolves.' To them, most 'lone wolves' tend to be 'self-radicalised.'

A research on violent radicalisation among militant Islamists in the U.K. conducted by behavioural researchers in a U.K. Government security service, found among other things that:

'no profile or single pathway to extremism existed';… some vulnerability existed that made the person receptive to the ideology, but as with earlier studies, the process of becoming 'radicalized' appears to have occurred incrementally over time, not as a discrete event.' (Travis 2008; cited in Borum 2011: 55)

King and Taylor (2011: 62-65)'s study on the radicalisation of home-grown jihadists reveals three psychological factors with the potential to effectuate radicalisation: 'group relative deprivation, identity conflicts, and personality characteristics' (ibid. 65). King & Taylor's finding corroborates most of the literature reviewed above; they also show a great linkage between radicalisation and terrorism and add their voices to the call for a shared and unambiguous understanding of the nature and processes of radicalisation and terrorism as an essential tool for curbing the phenomenon. In effect, any fight geared toward annihilating terrorism must take into account the import of radicalisation and the need to tackle both as one entity.

III. ELEMENTS OF TERRORISM

Terrorism has been described by the U.S. State Department as 'a premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by substantial groups or clandestine agents' (2011: 9) and it is done to 'intimidate a population or compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing anything or taking any action…' (UNSC 1566, 2004). Thus, terrorists may include groups (radical political/ideological organisations), individuals acting as agents or just 'lone wolves;' state sponsored terrorism is also not uncommon. Whatever it is that they do, there is no doubt that they are underpinned by some reasons. What is intriguing is the relevance of such reasons vis-à-vis the heinous atrocities they often unleashed on the innocent. Typically, terror acts often involve:

I. Violent methods – killing, hostage-taking, assassinations, destruction of property, disappearances and willingness to cross the limit of what is deemed acceptable;

II. A conscious strategy of instilling constant and increasing fear, shock and uncertainty among a large population;

III. An intent/strategy with specific political and/or ideological or religious objectives;

IV. A hard-line determination and commitment towards achieving a certain goal usually through uncompromising violent means.

Terrorists have no conscience of consideration, especially when hard pressed. They may resort to all means of violence when the opportunity is rife. While their methods and goals don't alter principally, scholars have argued that terrorism has transformed from its old form to a new form. Peter Neumann has given this development as shown in Table 1.

Table 1: Development from 'old to new terrorism'

Old terrorism			New terrorism		
Structure	Aim	Method	Structure	Aim	Method
Organization	Political/ ideology	Violence	Diffuse	Religious (political/ ideology)	Mass violence
Hierarchical		Psychological effect	Networked		Gain publicity
Chain of command		Gain publicity	Flat command		Undermine government/soci al order
Cell structure		Undermine government	Peer-to-peer/'lone wolf'		Provoke repression
National/local		Provoke repression	Transnational/global/l ocal/de-territorialised		

Source: Peter Neumann (2009). *Old & New Terrorism: Late Modernity, Globalization and the Transformation of Political Violence*. Cambridge, Polity

Old and new terrorism:

The famous historian of terrorism, Walter Laqueur, had noted months before the 9/11attacks that a new wave of 'revolution' in the character of terrorism seemed imminent. He asserted that the new form of terrorism had no defined boundary and could be more dangerous and deadly as compared to the existing ones; the new terrorists would operate with the intention 'to liquidate all satanic forces [and destroy] all life on earth [found infidel].' Laqueur (1999), thus, perceived a world faced with the rise of 'new terrorists' who would have no hesitation about using weapons of mass destruction, and other Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles to bombard the earth and wipe out its inhabitants. Though, his speculations have often been considered by some scholars as been overstated, the wave of new terrorism confronting the world somehow vindicates him or validates his "prophecy." ISIS, Boko Haram, al-Qaeda, the Taliban and Al-Shabaab have proven much more prone towards wiping out a population, race or religious group in the 21st century.

During the 1990s, many terrorist related groups such as the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) recognised Israel and made an attempt at renouncing the use of terrorism; the Irish Republican Army (IRA) in Northern Ireland relaxed its heinous acts and entered government; 'and in April 1998, even the German Red Army Faction (RAF) finally declared its campaign to be over, announcing that 'the urban guerrilla in the form of the RAF is now history' (Neumann 2009). Just when the world was still mending its wounds from such turbulence including the Cold War, al-Qaeda began its onslaught, propelling itself to prominence with the 9/11 attacks. Since then the increase and widening network of terrorism have been alarming.

While some scholars trace the origin of new terrorism to the appearance of al-Qaeda most analysts date the first appearance of 'new terrorism' to March 1995 when a Japanese cult, Aum Shinrikyo launched a nerve Sarin gas attack on the Tokyo metro system demising 12 people and injuring more than 1000 others. Others like Neumann (2009) regard the 1993 attack on the World Trade Center in New York by a group of Islamist extremists led by Ramzi Yousef as a significant part of the history of the era of the new terrorism. An American right-wing extremist, Timothy McVeigh, followed Tokyo's terror incident with a truck bomb in Oklahoma City destroying 168 lives. The Anders Breivik attacks in Norway on 22nd July, 2011, which led 77 dead, were considered the bloodiest act of terrorism in Europe since 2004.[1]

Clearly, the new terrorism has shown extreme intolerance and a penchant for the utilization of weapons of mass destruction. There is no doubt that its complexity and nuances are still far from unequivocal comprehension. The rejuvenation of al-Qaeda, the rise of ISIS, Boko Haram and other ancillary terrorist groups as well as lone wolves and well-coordinated high profile attacks 'onshore' and 'offshore' (and 'even in-air') across the globe is an indication that the world is witnessing a common enemy whose structures, aims and methods are not only diffused but also unpredictable. For instance, both al-Qaeda and ISIS seem to be truly "de-territorialised'' with their membership knowing no limit. Their notoriety in radicalising and employing young men and women from all backgrounds and parts of the world is obvious to all. Both groups are also known for changing or shifting their 'centres of gravity' from one location to the other – often across continents and as Neumann (2009) puts it, 'depending on where members and their leaders believe victory is most likely.' One significant feature of the 21sr century terrorism is the ability of the TG's to coordinate acts in multiple places with sympathisers located in several countries – a network that eludes world leaders' intelligence system.

The gradual return of religiously motivated terrorism associated with most of the new terrorist groups is even much more worrisome. Indeed, Hoffman (2012) has revealed that whereas in the late 1960s, no terrorist group could be branded as religiously oriented, the case was different in the mid-1990s. The period witnessed an enormous rise in religiously inspired terror groups (ibid.) that has continued till today. The danger associated with this genre of terrorism is the fact that its origin is rooted in indoctrination, fanaticism and radicalisation. These three elements present no sense of guilt on the part of the terrorists since they are convinced without any shred of doubt of the appropriateness and acceptance of their acts by their deity – thus, they can go all out and all length with whatever they intend to achieve. The 2015 Paris and San Bernardino terrorist attacks corroborate the level of atrocities characteristic of this new wave of terrorism. Often than not, foreign attackers are able to link up and work with citizens of the 'prey country.' The complexity and scope of the new terrorism has also been fuelled by modernity – information and communication technology, technological advancement (in the areas of science and engineering), globalization and socialization making it possible for transnational acts – thus, using technology against technology or 'modernity against modernity.'

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[1] Norway killer Anders Breivik ruled sane, given 21-year prison term by Laura Smith-Spark, CNN http://edition.cnn.com/2012/08/24/world/europe/norway-breivik-trial/

IV.   AFRICA IN THE FACE OF THE 21ST-CENTURY TERRORISM

Africa has not been spared in the new wave of unprecedented terror attacks that have characterised the turn of the century. Parts of Africa, especially Sub-Saharan Africa and the Sahel region have become battlefronts in the combat against terrorism by jihadists and other extremists. The loss of sanity and the breakdown of law and order in Libya, in particular, has created a power vacuum and a safe haven for the Islamic State (ISIS) terrorist group to gain a foothold on the African continent. This has allowed the organization to gain momentum and spread its tentacles across the continent, radicalising many youth on the continent amidst brutalities (see Table 2). In West Africa, Boko Haram, another jihadist terrorist group which has aligned itself with ISIS has killed thousands in Nigeria and its neighbouring nations — and kidnapped hundreds of people including young girls. In Somalia, Al-Shabaab, an affiliate of al-Qaeda, continues its onslaughts against innocent civilians in neighbouring countries and it's poised to 'prevent Somalia from re-establishing a functioning government' (Beary 2015). Interestingly, such acts of violence have equally forced tomes of people to flee the turbulent zones to other parts of the world in search of safe havens and greener pastures.

Boko Haram and ISIS were jointly responsible for 51 per cent of all claimed global fatalities in 2014 (Kirk 2016) with Boko Haram now considered the world's deadliest and bloodiest terrorist group than Daesh (ISIS/ISIL) - 2014. Nigeria experienced the largest increase in terrorist activity with 7,512 deaths in 2014 - an increase of over 300 per cent since 2013 (ibid.) (see Figures 1 & 2). As Ashley Kirk reveals 'Terrorism has soared in the Middle East and Africa in recent years, with people in these regions seeing the impact of terrorism increase more than anywhere else in the world' (2015) (see Figures 1 & 2). The Volatility of these regions is a contributing factor to the rise and influence of terror activities in their enclaves.

Table 2: The Global Terrorism Index

Rank	Country	Terror Rating
1	Iraq	10.00
2	Afghanistan	9.23
3	Nigeria	9.21
4	Pakistan	9.07
5	Syria	8.11
6	India	7.75
7	Yemen	7.64
8	Somalia	7.60
9	Libya	7.29
10	Thailand	7.28
11	Philippines	7.27
12	Ukraine	7.20
13	Egypt	6.81
14	Central African Republic	6.72
15	South Sudan	6.71
16	Sudan	6.69
17	Colombia	6.66
18	Kenya	6.66
19	Democratic Republic of the Congo	6.49
20	Cameroon	6.47
21	Lebanon	6.38
22	China	6.29
23	Russia	6.21
24	Israel	6.03

Rank	Country	Terror Rating
25	Bangladesh	5.92
26	Mali	5.87
27	Turkey	5.74
28	United Kingdom	5.61
29	Greece	4.98
30	Uganda	4.89
31	Bahrain	4.87
32	Nepal	4.79
33	Indonesia	4.76
34	Algeria	4.75
35	United States	4.61
36	France	4.55
37	Mozambique	4.39
38	South Africa	4.23
39	Iran	4.22
40	Paraguay	4.09
41	Myanmar	4.08
42	Sri Lanka	4.08
43	Saudi Arabia	4.01
44	Mexico	3.99
45	Tanzania	3.98
46	Chile	3.97
47	Tunisia	3.70
48	Ireland	3.66
49	Malaysia	3.58
50	Ethiopia	3.54

Source: World Atlas (2015), The Global Terrorism Index. Available at: http://www.worldatlas.com/articles/the-global-terrorism-index-countries-most-affected-by-terrorist-attacks.html (Accessed: 21/01/2017).

Source: Data from Kirk, Ashley (2016). Mapped: Which countries suffer the most from terrorism? The Telegraph, 24 March, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/03/29/mapped-which-countries-suffer-the-most-from-terrorism. (Accessed:30/01/2017).

Figure 1: Countries suffering the biggest impacts from terrorism

Source: Data from Ashley Kirk (2016), Mapped: Which countries suffer the most from terrorism?

**Figure 2: The largest increases in terrorism over 10 years**

Indeed, both Table 2 and Figures 1and 2 indicate that Africa, especially the Sahel region and the sub-Saharan corridors have witnessed a crescendo of terrorist perpetuated atrocities over the last decade. Nigeria remains one of the five most terrorist prone countries in the world (GTI 2015); recording several deaths (see Figure 1 and Table 2). Also, the six new countries considered incessantly prone to terrorist related deaths, circa, 500 include Somalia, Central African Republic, South Sudan and Cameroon (Ibid.). As shown in Figure 2, terrorist activities have also increased tremendously in African countries such as Libya, Central African Republic and South Sudan since 2011, with Central African Republic already experiencing an increase in the previous years. Nigeria, for example, 'witnessed the largest increase in terrorist deaths ever recorded by any country, increasing by over 300 per cent to 7,512 fatalities' (Ibid. 2). This was mainly caused by Boko Haram, the jihadist group considered the most deadly terrorist group in the world in 2014. It has in recent times been referred to as the Islamic State's West Africa Province (ISWAP). Statistics have shown that Middle-East, North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa had the highest terrorist related deaths in 2014 (Ibid.). These regions suffer many more casualties in terrorist attacks than other regions.

Interestingly, three of the five most deadly terrorist groups in the world operate predominantly in Africa – Boko Haram, Al-Shabaab and the Fulani Militants (see Figure 3). Akin to these groups, ISIL which was considered the second deadliest terror group in 2014 has strongholds in Egypt and Libya. The sporadic occurrence of terrorist motivated carnages across Africa in the first quarter of the millennium is alarming. The heinous atrocities caused by other terror groups like Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) and Allied Democratic Forces/National Army for the Liberation of Uganda (ADF/NALU), al-Mulathamun Battalion (AMB), lone wolves, politically motivated groups and individuals on countless occasions – all go to show that the continent faces eminent security phenomenon that requires both domestic and exotic efforts to combat a necessary evil. Libya, Nigeria and Egypt were among the ten countries with the most terrorist attacks in the world in 2015[2] whereas Somalia, Cameroon and Niger were among the ten countries with the most terrorist related deaths in 2015.[3]

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[2] National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism: Annex of Statistical Information
Country Reports on Terrorism,2015 http://www.start.umd.edu/acessed: 22/01/2017
[3] Ibid.

Source: compiled from data from Global Terrorism Index, 2015: 'Measuring the Impact of Terrorism' by Institute for Economics & Peace, www.economicsandpeace.org, pp. 37

Figure 3: Five most deadly terrorist groups in the world

Table 3: Incidents of terrorist events across Africa, 2010-2015

Year:	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Countries attacked :						
Uganda	ASB++					O
Burkina Faso						O++
South Sudan		O++				
Somalia	O & ASB++	ASB++	ASM & O++	ASB++	ASB/O++	ASB++
Mauritania		AQIM++				
Djibouti					ASB+	
Chad						BKH++
Cameroon				BKH++	BKH++/O+	BKH&O++
Kenya		O++ /ASB^S	ASB^S & O++	ASB &O++	ASB & O++	ASB++
Mali		AQIM++/O/AQIM^S	AQIM & O++	AQIM &O++	AQIM & O++	AQIM & O++
Senegal						
Nigeria	BKH++	BKH/ & O++	BKH & O++	BKH^{S++}	BKH/O++	BKH++/O
*CAR						
Year:	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Ethiopia	O+		O+	ASB		O
Rwanda	O++	O++	O++			
DRC		O++	O++	O++		
Year:	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Country						
Mauritania	AQIM					
Niger	AQIM++	AQIM+	O+	AQIM**/AQ/BKH^{S*}	BKH/o++	BKH++/o
Algeria		AQIM/++	AQIM & O++	AQIM&O++	AQIM/O	AQIM/O++
Egypt		O++	O++	O++	O++	ISIL & O++
Tunisia		O	O++	O++	O++/AQIM	ISIL, AQIM &O++
Libya		GRA+++	O++	O++	O+++/ISIL	ISIL & O++
Morocco		O				
Terrorist groups: Boko Haram, Fullani Militants, Al-Shabaab, Al-Qaeda* & Others						

Sources: compiled from data from: 1. National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (2016), Annex of Statistical Information Country Reports on Terrorism, 2015. 30 June, http://www.start.umd.edu. Accessed: 22/01/2017, 2. The U.S. State Department, Country Reports on Terrorism, 2010-2015 https://www.state.gov. Accessed: 22/01/2017, 3. Scale[4]

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[4] +: multiple attacks around the same time/between short intervals

Clearly, as shown in Table 3, acts of terrorism by extremist and para-terrorist groups have spread and eaten into the fabric of the African society, with their heinous incidents being recorded across almost all nooks and crannies on the continent[5]. A detailed account of how some of such inhumane acts were perpetrated by these extremist groups in tandem with other individual sympathisers who are self-radicalised or bear allegiance to terror groups such as: Boko Haram, Fulani Militants, Al-Shabaab, Al-Qaeda, lone wolves, FDLR, LRA, ADF/NALU, AMB, the Mali-based Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), Ansar al-Shari'a (AAS), Benghazi and AAS Darnah, Ansar al-Shari'a in Tunisia (AAS-T), Ard al-Jazayer, al Murabitoun show acts of beheading, amputation, flogging, suicide bombings, dropping of grenades and other explosives on buildings, social gatherings, to mention a few.[6]

Obviously, many heinous crimes are being committed against the African community that have not received due attention partly because of the war in Syria and the conflict in Iraq where the great powers have special geopolitical interests. Boko Haram, Al-Shabaab, Al-Qaeda FDLR, LRA, ADF/NALU, AMB, AASs and MUJAO continue with their sporadic onslaughts against innocent civilians, governments and political and diplomatic figures as well as businesses and other vital facilities in the African regions where they predominantly operate. Unfortunately, efforts made to curb this threat have not really yielded the desired results, prompting governments and world leaders to look for alternatives. A violent campaigned waged by the ADF alone between 1997 and 2001 saw "48 explosive devices being detonated in and around Kampala, killing approximately 50 and injuring an estimated 200 people" (Botha 2004: 66). Kenya suffered one of the deadliest terrorist attacks in its history when Al-Shabaab violently assaulted the Garissa University College in April using light arms and suicide vests (U.S. State Department 2015). More than 145 Kenyans died in that attack, with most of them being students (Ibid.).

As shown by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (2015), terrorist acts have strong historical correlation with nations already experiencing political instability. Comparing the location of all 'terrorist attacks to all battle-related deaths resulting from conflicts involving at least one state actor' Institute of Economic and Peace (IEP) 'has found that 55 per cent of all terrorist attacks occurred in countries in the midst of an internal armed conflict... [and] another 33 per cent occurred in countries that were either experiencing or involved in an internationalised conflict.[7] Thus, given the general political volatility of the African region, it is not surprising to find terrorist groups having strong footings on the continent. This is also an indication that the region as a whole should coordinate activities aimed at effectively alleviating the dangers posed by such a common enemy – terrorism.

V. THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM IN THE 21ST CENTURY

'*Confronting the threat of terrorism anywhere requires at least a rudimentary level of local political will and security capacity, particularly in terms of intelligence and law enforcement'* (Forest and Giroux 2011).

There is no question about the teething political, social and economic implications posed by the rise of terrorism in the world. The phenomenon has become a stench in the history of the world, with its modern network apparatus and faceted trends. Global and continental efforts in eschewing and combating terrorism have a long history. Traditional approaches to counterterrorism schemes have often focused on security that targets terrorist activity head-on. Thus, issues underpinning the process of radicalisation and subsequent extremism are relegated. Terrorism as witnessed in the 21st century, however, presents new challenges that call for a better understanding of both the drivers and trends of terrorism. A new global debate focuses principally on 'countering violent Extremism' (CVE) through prevention strategies with the purpose of devising ways to lessen drastically the pool of individuals that may be susceptible to radicalisation - acting as lone wolves or as part of a group. The aim is therefore to fully appreciate all the nuances and interchange of the political, economic, social and ideological drivers so as to inform the relevant ameliorating programmes. Thus, the new global CVE aims to kill 'the bull by the heart.' As noted by Forest and Giroux (2011: 12)

++: multiple attacks and on different occasions

BKH: Boko Haram, FM= Fulani Militants, ASB: Al-Shabaab, AQIM: Al-Qaeda, O:other [s]:suspected terrorist group

Other: refers to Lone wolves, Para-terrorist groups, the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) , the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), Allied Democratic Forces/National Army for the Liberation of Uganda (ADF/NALU), al-Mulathamun Battalion (AMB), the Mali-based Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), Ansar al-Shari'a (AAS) Benghazi and AAS Darnah, Ansar al-Shari'a in Tunisia (AAS-T), Ard al-Jazayer (JAK, Soldiers of the Caliphate in Algeria), al Murabitoun, GRA= government and rebel activities not necessary terrorist events

*CAR: Central African Republic, *Al-Qaeda: not considered one of the five deadly terrorist groups

[5] The list is not exhaustive, for a complete and more detailed data on terrorist incidents in all countries in Africa; see the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), 29 June, 2016. https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd

[6] See *Country Reports on Terrorism* by the U.S. State Department, 2010-2016 and GTD, 29 June, 2016

[7] Uppsala University, UCDP Battle-Related Deaths Dataset v.5-2015, Uppsala Conflict Data Program, www.ucdp.uu.se. (Accessed: 24/01/2017).

The contexts for combating terrorism in Africa, both in its domestic and transnational forms, have changed in recent decades. Scholars and policy makers have increasingly recognized the limitations of a typical African government's ability to effectively combat a sophisticated domestic terrorist threat – particularly one with transnational linkages.

Interestingly, though the combat against terrorism in the millennium has been a major collaborative effort by both continental and global powers in terms of technology, intelligence sharing, logistics, personnel and training, the core of the problem is often ignored or not well attended to.

The fight against terrorism in Africa dates back to several years. In 1992, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), at its 28th Ordinary Session meeting held in Dakar, Senegal, adopted a 'Resolution on the Strengthening of Cooperation and Coordination among African States' [AHG/Res.213 (XXVIII)] in which the members unanimously vowed to combat the growing threat of the 'phenomena of extremism and terrorism' (AU Counter Terrorism Framework 2015). Then in June 1994, at its 30th Ordinary Session held in Tunis, Tunisia, the organization adopted the 'Declaration on the Code of Conduct for Inter-African Relations [AHG/Del.2 (XXX)],' denouncing all forms of extremism and terrorism, including those perpetrated ostensibly for reasons covering sectarianism, tribalism, ethnicity or religion. The declaration also objected to all terrorist acts, methods and practices which it regarded as criminal, and professed its determination to battle such acts (Ibid).[8]

In September 2002, the AU Plan of Action on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism was adopted by the Union. The Plan of Action seeks to employ counterterrorism (CT) measures that effectively address Africa's security challenges. Such measures relate to issues regarding police and border control, legislative and judicial measures, financing of terrorism and exchange of information.[9] The AU Special Representative for Counter-Terrorism Cooperation was appointed in October 2010 and has since undertaken a number of tasks meant for galvanizing support for the fight against the rise and curse of terrorism as well as assessing the prevailing conditions in various 'Member States and identify, with the concerned national authorities, priority security issues to be addressed.'[10] Akin to this, the AU Commission also developed the African Model Law on Counter Terrorism, which was accepted and adopted by the Assembly [Assembly/AU/Dec. 369(XVII)] in July 2011[11]. The Model Law has been put in place to offer succour to Member States in executing effectively the stipulations enshrined in the various continental and international counter-terrorism instruments, which encapsulate inter alia, the 1999 OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism and its related Protocol (AU Counter Terrorism Framework, 2015).

It is therefore not far-fetched for Forest and Giroux's (2011) assertion that:

In Africa, outside intervention has sometimes been necessary for bolstering a state's capabilities in these areas. In this respect, the United Nations has made some strides in assisting African states develop the appropriate legal frameworks and institutional capacity to address issues such as terrorist financing and money laundering.

However, as noted by Forest and Giroux (2011), terrorism, especially in the new millennium is a contextual phenomenon with dicey nuances, 'requiring a specific, context-aware response.' Thus, to better fathom the diversity of these contexts and trends, is a major asset towards devising appropriate and efficacious counterterrorism stratagems for Africa in the 21st-century. African states have collaborated on many continental and global fronts to tackle the terrorism on its shores. Table 4 gives a synopsis of such efforts.

Table 4: Counter terrorism efforts in Africa (as of 2015)

Country	Legislation, law enforcement & border security	Countering the finances of terrorism	Countering violent extremism	International & regional cooperation
Uganda	***	**	**	***
Tanzania	**	**	**	****
Burkina Faso	***	**	*	***
Somalia	**	***	****	****
Burundi	*	*	*	**
Djibouti	****	**	**	***
Chad	****	**	***	****
Cameroon	****	***	***	***

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[8] - See more at: http://www.peaceau.org/en/page/64-counter-terrorism-t#sthash.EfpfSMRE.dpuf accessed: 30/01/2017

[9] Ibid.

[10] Ibid.

[11] Ibid.

Country	Legislation, law enforcement & border security	Countering the finances of terrorism	Countering violent extremism	International & regional cooperation
Kenya	****	***	***	****
Mali	***	***	**	***
Senegal	**	**	**	***
Nigeria	****	**	**	****
Ethiopia	**	**	**	***
Eritrea	**	*	**	**
Country	Legislation, law enforcement & border security	Countering the finances of terrorism	Countering violent extremism	International & regional cooperation
South Africa	***	***		*
Mauritania	**	**	***	****
Niger	****	***	**	****
Algeria	****	****	****	***
Egypt	****	***	****	****
Tunisia	****	****	***	****
Libya	*	**	*	*
Morocco	****	****	****	****

Source: compiled from data from the U.S. State Department: Country Reports on Terrorism 2010-2015

*Scale[12]: *: less involved, **: involved, ***: very involved, ****: extremely involved -*

Table 4 highlights some of the measures taking so far by a number of African countries in the fight against terrorism.[13] Most of the countries introduced basically the same strategies but with different levels of efficiency and commitment. As indicated in Table 4, the countries in North Africa, apart from Libya for obvious reasons, appear to be much more serious with their counterterrorism initiatives than those in the Sahel and Sub-Saharan regions.[14] Such measures or initiatives range from regional, continental and global information sharing and communication on intelligence matters; regional, continental and global partnerships aimed at combating terrorism in combined efforts; enactment and adoption of anti-terrorism laws both locally and internationally; local counter-radicalisation (CR) programmes which include state sponsored radio programmes, CR messages on social media, controlled and monitored religious activities; fiscal counterterrorism financing policies; increased border and airport security controls.[15]

Unfortunately, not all the countries have shown much commitment to the fight against this phenomenon. For example, countries like Uganda, Burkina Faso, South Africa, Tanzania, Mauritania, Nigeria, Ethiopia and Eritrea show interest and commitment in one or two areas while they relax in other areas of the counterterrorism journey. It is also observed that on the average, those countries with high incidence or more prone to terrorist incidents are largely 'involved' than those less prone or have a lower degree of terror threats. Countries like Morocco, Niger, Algeria, Egypt, Tunisia, Somalia, Djibouti, Chad, Cameroon, Kenya and Mali have shown much commitment. Nigeria and Libya present exceptional cases – Libya for obvious reasons of it been perceived as a failed state, lacks the political power and total control over some parts of its territory, including financial constraints and capable and reliable state military apparatus to effectively engage and implement such efforts and their augmenting tactics; Nigeria, despite having the political power and economic muzzle to vehemently get 'involved,' it has often shown enthusiasm in two areas but not in all four major initiatives. It has acted 'extremely stronger' or got 'extremely involved' in areas covering legislation, law enforcement & border security and

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[12] The scales are determined based on new initiatives, effective implementation and success, levels of local, regional, continental & global collaborations/cooperation.

[13] See Bureau of Counterterrorism and Countering Violent Extremism Country Reports on Terrorism 2015 Report, https://www.state.gov. accessed: 22/01/2017 for country specifics

[14] TRANS-SAHARA COUNTERTERRORISM PARTNERSHIP (TSCTP) was established in 2005, it is a U.S.-funded and -implemented, multi-faceted, multi-year effort designed to build the capacity and cooperation of military, law enforcement, and civilian actors across North and West Africa to counter terrorism. Its members: members: Algeria, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, and Tunisia. (Bureau of Counterterrorism and Countering Violent Extremism Country Reports on Terrorism 2015 Report, https://www.state.gov. accessed: 22/01/2017)

PARTNERSHIP FOR REGIONAL EAST AFRICA COUNTERTERRORISM (PREACT) was established in 2009, and it is a U.S.-funded and -implemented multi-year, multi-faceted program designed to build counterterrorism capacity and cooperation of military, law enforcement, and civilian actors across East Africa to counter terrorism. Its active members: Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Tanzania, and Uganda. Burundi, Comoros, Rwanda, Seychelles, South Sudan, and Sudan (Bureau of Counterterrorism and Countering Violent Extremism Country Reports on Terrorism 2015 Report, https://www.state.gov. accessed: 22/01/2017)

[15] See Table 4

international & regional cooperation while performing abysmally in countering the finances of terrorism and violent extremism despite its own teething local problem with the extremist group, Boko Haram (see Bureau of Counterterrorism and Countering Violent Extremism *Country Reports on Terrorism* 2015 Report for details of specific initiatives undertaken by the various states).

Moreover, while initiatives adopted and implemented by a few countries like Morocco and Mauritania, yielded some results in warding off extremists attacks, the majority of the African countries considered here continued to witness scores of terror-related attacks with some of them like Niger, Nigeria, Libya, Cameroon, Egypt, Algeria, Somalia, and Tunisia experiencing significant impact (see Table 3). It is also worth noting that as found by IEP, terrorism seems to thrive in the countries that are undergoing some forms of political violence or intra/interstate conflicts (GTI 2015: 67). 'In countries that are not undergoing internal violent conflict, socioeconomic drivers correlate more prominently with terrorist attacks' (Ibid.). A critical examination of most of the countries in the continent facing terrorist-related issues reveals no exceptionality – they are undergoing political turbulence, economic tardiness or both.[16] Why haven't the measures taken so far yielded the desired outcome? Why are terrorist groups able to rejuvenate whenever they are pruned? Why has terrorism become so perverse in the 21st century? The following section looks into these pertinent issues and provides grounding approaches to match the new trends of terrorism in Africa in particular and the globe as whole.

VI. NEW TRENDS, NEW WAYS

"Terrorism is driven by a variety of country-specific factors and individual characteristics. Reasons that people join FARC will be different to those who join ISIL, which will again be different to those who perpetrate lone wolf attacks" (GTI 2015).

Thus, it suffices to say that the reasons underscoring the prevalence of terrorism in one country might be (slightly) different from those underpinning terrorism in another country. A study conducted by the United States Institute of Peace (USIP)[17] in 2013 to find out the rational for people engaging in or joining violent extremist groups, particularly Al-Qaeda identified 'identity, anger, status and thrill seeking' in order of importance as the cardinal motivating factors for which people join extremist groups and engage in violent extremism. Clearly, ideology is only one of the reasons; however, it becomes the most driving force in terms of extremism. It goes without saying that in as much as the other three factors are equally important, to better understand the entrenchment of extremist groups as well as the atrocities that often characterise their activities, the role played by both political and religious ideologies must be well scrutinised. Agreed that the new trend of terrorism has assumed a more sophisticated dimension and scale which calls for efficient combined efforts, regionally, continentally and globally; such efforts will remain ephemeral until factors such as: counter-radicalisation narratives, citizen/community-terrorism vigilante, media information screening, proper and fair monitoring of religious activities are equally given prominence. Since a 'hungry man is an angry man,' poverty alleviation and general economic hardship relief initiatives could to a large extent help eliminate the tendencies that often compel the youth in particular, to seek membership in such groups. Though, these measures are long term initiatives, they will eventually yield fruits.

Prevention, they say, it's better than cure! You may cut the "mother" plantain tree, but the suckers will always be there to ensure continuity. Terrorism has reached a stage that defiles heavy concentration on realist material capability, including the use of military, machine-guns, drones grenades etc. to combat its scourge. A good deal of consideration should be given to areas aforementioned in the previous paragraph. Information technology and communication coupled with especially new media avenues is one of the major tools employed by these heinous perpetrators to not only recruit but also radicalise, dwelling principally on outrageous propaganda and falsehood. It is therefore prudent that while sharing intelligence on terrorists and their modus operandi the internet and the media (electronic, printing & digital) be closely monitored for suspicious acts. Morocco, Senegal and Mauritania seem to enjoy relative gains in the fight against terrorism (see Table 3) because they put much emphasis on counter- radicalisation programmes as well as equipping the gullible communities.[18] Citizen vigilante and community journalism, which have become popular in Africa for election

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[16] See Global Terrorism Index (2015) - Correlates and Drivers of Terrorism. https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd pp.67-72;
The U.S. State Department: *Country Reports on Terrorism* 2010-2015, https://www.state.gov.
[17] United States Institute of Peace (2013), 'Countering Violent Extremism: A Peacebuilding Perspective', http://www. icnl.org/research/library/files/Transnational/CVEUSIP.pdf Accessed: 30/01/2017
[18] For details on countering violent extremism, **see** (The U.S. State Department: *Country Reports on Terrorism* 2010-2015,

monitoring can be replicated in the fight against terrorism on the continent. A close observation of Tables 2 & 3 and Figures 1, 2 & 3 shows that terrorism on the African continent is prevalent mostly in Islamic dominated communities, thus, suggesting a strong link between terrorism and religious ideology in these countries. The implication is that the terror groups tend to find a safe haven where they find sympathy with the community and the citizens, a typical case in point is Nigeria's Boko Haram which operates predominantly in the northern region where Islam is prevalent. In effect, any combating effort should factor in the importance of the stance of these communities and individuals – citizen/community vigilante. Such communities and individuals ought to be rigorously and consciously sensitized, engaged and encouraged to get on board in the counterterrorism endeavours playing vigilante roles of anti-radicalisation and stool pigeon. This strategy could be more efficient if it comes with some stipends or other forms of reward and it should be well decentralised for efficiency.

VII. CONCLUSION

The trend assumed by the 21st-century terrorism depicts one major thing: 'the use of modernity against modernity' (Neumann 2009). In other words, the use of good against good to produce 'bad'; employing technology against technology to achieve evil instead of good is what TGs are manipulating. Radicalisation is no longer an enclosed community phenomenon; it has become a global canker without boundaries. However, its entrenchment is country and community specific - extreme religious beliefs or teachings lead to fanaticism which eventually hatches habituation wrought in absolute faith, a condition prone to extremist act − when one feels threatened or undermined (in terms of his/her faith or ideology). Akin to this, societies with high degrees of political violence and/or internal conflicts (with or without) the involvement of external powers and unemployment and low human capacity development tend to provide a relatively high safe haven for extremist activities.

The majority of the countries in Africa where extremist groups seem to thrive tend to have in addition to political ideologies, religious inclinations as well (see Tables 1, 2 & 3). This assertion is corroborated by the fact three of the five most deadly terrorist groups in the world operate predominantly in Islamic dominated countries in Africa – Boko Haram, Al-Shabaab and the Fulani Militants (see Figure 3) and are driven principally by religious ideas, though not typically apolitical. Libya, Nigeria and Egypt were among the ten countries with the most terrorist attacks in the world in 2015[19] whereas Somalia, Cameroon and Niger were among the ten countries with the most terror related deaths in 2015.[20] All these countries are predominantly Muslim states. Also, ISIL/ISIS and other terror groups like Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, al-Mulathamun Battalion (AMB), all have religious colorations. Notably, others like the FDLR, LRA and ADF/NALU are typically political, operating in countries not considered predominantly Islamic states.

The discourse show that combating terrorism through the 'policy of containment' by freezing assets, eliminating or curtailing their chain of financing, engaging them in military combat, including the use of drones, grenades, etc. is not enough unless it is linked up with the 'policies of using modernity against the fallout of modernity' and 'eradication by counter-radicalisation programmes'[21] as discussed above. This will eventually limit their numbers as it becomes difficult to replenish members killed or arrested. It will also culminate in effective 'exhumation' of the ideology driver, thus, completely quelling their (TGs') sources of human supply. Until that's achieved, the world and in particular, Sub-Saharan and Sahel regions of Africa may simply see the annihilation of ISIL, Al-Qaeda, Boko Haram, Al-Shabaab, the Fulani Militant & other TGs without the ideology and other TG-induced factors fizzling out. It therefore behoves political, religious and other opinion leaders to consciously and continuously embark on de-radicalisation processes, intensifying citizen/community vigilantism, and of course, without shedding already existing measures, including regional, continental, global co-operations, financial laws, security step-ups and many others all aimed at combating the terrorism phenomenon plaguing the world in the first and second quarters of the 21st century. Governments should liaise with religious leaders and unions to ensure that the right people are appointed as teachers of religious beliefs, especially Islam. As employed in Morocco, Senegal and Mauritania, African leaders should endeavour to spread effective community radio system to further educate the community about the evils of terrorism and to counterfoil radicalisation; they should also take the appointment of (Islamic) religious leaders seriously.

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https://www.state.gov. accessed: 22/01/2017)

[19] For more see National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism: Annex of Statistical Information Country Reports on Terrorism,2015 http://www.start.umd.edu/acessed: 22/01/2017

[20] Ibid.

[21] See Atran, 2003

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